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IT HAS TO END SOMEWHERE: FEIEREISEN V.
NEWPAGE CORP. AND THE SCOPE OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Benjamin R. Hutchinson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In January of 2008, Kurt Feiereisen was driving to attend a mediation meeting
regarding his workers’ compensation claims when he was injured in a car
accident.1 At the time, Feiereisen was pursuing three separate claims against
Newpage Corporation for bodily injuries that he had sustained while working for
the company during the years of 1987, 1997, and 2007.2 In June of 2008 he
petitioned for compensation awards related to the injuries from all four occasions.3
The hearing officer granted awards for the three earliest injuries, but denied
compensation for the injury sustained during the car accident in 2008, claiming that
this injury did not occur during the course of employment.4 Feiereisen appealed
the decision of the hearing officer, and the Law Court granted review, seeking to
address the sole question of whether “the injury resulting from a car accident that
occurred en route to a workers’ compensation mediation arose out of and in the
course of employment.”5
The Law Court answered that question in the negative, and affirmed the
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board.6 Justice Gorman,7 writing for the
majority, asserted that because Newpage had neither control over the risk of the car
accident, nor responsibility over the automobile or the driving public at the time, it
could not be held responsible for the injuries that Feiereisen sustained in the
accident.8 There were dual rationales for arriving at this conclusion. First, the
majority discussed the “public streets rule”9 and the exceptions thereto,10 and
ultimately decided that Feiereisen’s injuries from the car accident were not covered
by any exception to the rule.11 Next, the majority debated whether the mediation
* J.D. Candidate 2012. The author would like to thank Professor Jennifer Wriggins for advising
on this case note.
1. Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 3, 5 A.3d 669.
2. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
3. Id. ¶ 4.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 5.
6. Id. ¶ 13.
7. It is interesting to note that Justice Gorman was formerly a member of the Maine Workers’
Compensation Commission.
Supreme Court Justice Biographies, MAINE.GOV (2011),
http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine_courts/supreme/justices_bios.html.
8. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669.
9. Id. ¶ 7. The public streets rule asserts that an accident occurring during travel to and from a
place of employment and off the employer’s premises is not compensable. Id. (citing Waycott v.
Beneficial Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979)).
10. Id. ¶ 8.
11. Id. ¶ 13.
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was in the “interests of the employer”12 and ultimately decided that because
Feiereisen’s participation in the mediation was not in the interests of the company,
it was not part of the employment contract.13
Justice Jabar was joined by Justice Alexander in dissent.14 The dissent focused
on a “significant [statutory]15 change in worker’s compensation law”16 and asserted
that travel to the mediation meeting was “incident to employment.”17 The dissent
further argued that the statute altered the impact of prior case law upon Feiereisen’s
situation,18 and indicated that attendance at mandatory mediation should fall within
the scope of the employment contract.19 The dissent was reinforced by an
exception to the public streets rule, under which it was claimed that Feiereisen’s car
accident occurred during an “activity incident to employment.”20
This Note begins in Part II with a discussion of the history of workers’
compensation in Maine, with particular focus on the scope of the employment
contract, and then goes on to discuss the treatment of the same subjects in other
jurisdictions. In Part III, this Note evaluates the Feiereisen decision, with focus on
how the Law Court determined the scope of employment under relevant legal
principles, and how that determination affected the compensability of injuries that
occur during travel to workers’ compensation mediation. Part IV provides an
analysis of the public streets rule and the exceptions thereto, and discusses why the
employment contract should not include travel to and from mandatory mediation.
This Note, in Part V, concludes that the majority opinion used a sound approach to
define the scope of the employment contract for the purposes of workers’
compensation claims, and that an injury resulting from a car accident that occurred
en route to a mediation meeting should not be compensable.
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
A. Workers’ Compensation in Maine and What Defines an Employee
Workers’ compensation is in essence a statutorily-mandated agreement
between the employer and employee to compromise in the event the employee
suffers injury or disease in the course of employment21:

12. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
13. Id. ¶ 13.
14. Id. (Jabar, J., dissenting).
15. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A. § 313 (2010) (dealing with the reciprocal obligations of employer and
employee to attend workers’ compensation mediation).
16. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 19, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
17. Id. ¶ 22.
18. Id. ¶¶ 18-19 (citing Dorey v. Forster Mfg. Co., 591 A.2d 240 (Me. 1991)). Dorey held that an
injury incurred by an employee while she was retrieving records to pursue a workers’ compensation
claim did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Dorey, 591 A.2d at 241-42.
19. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 22, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. See Stephen W. Moriarty, Workers’ Compensation and Employer Immunity: The “Theoretical
Superstructure” Endures, 13 ME. B. J. 290, 290 (1998). “Stated simply, the Workers’ Compensation
Act gives employees injured on the job an administrative remedy, without regard to fault, in exchange
for employer immunity from civil damages for the injury.” Id.
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Once a workers’ compensation act has become applicable . . . it affords the
exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee or his dependents against the
employer and insurance carrier. This is part of the quid pro quo in which the
sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance,
for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the
22
prospect of large damage verdicts.

The first workers’ compensation statute in Maine took effect on January 1, 1916.23
Since that date, “employers have been immune from civil actions which otherwise
could have been brought by employees who have sustained occupational injuries or
diseases.”24 The exclusivity and immunity provisions of the statute “reflect a legal
and social compromise shared with virtually all other jurisdictions in the
country.”25 The current version of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) in
Maine was passed in 1992.26
The entitlement of an injured employee to workers’ compensation does not
come without preconditions; it is governed under an applicable section of the Act,
which reads: “[i]f an employee . . . receives a personal injury arising out of and in
the course of employment or is disabled by occupational disease, the employee
must be paid compensation and furnished medical and other services by the
employer who has assented to become subject to this Act.”27 The decision on
whether or not an employee is entitled to workers’ compensation is by necessity a
multi-layered analysis. In determining the scope of activities considered to be
within the employment contract, the words “arising out of and in the course of
employment” are construed as having central importance.28 Prior to even
considering whether or not an activity arose out of and in the course of
employment, a definition of the employment contract itself must be taken into
account.
The scope of the employment contract is partially defined by the extent to
which the employer consents29 to accept responsibility over the actions of an
22. 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 100.01[1]
(2009).
23. Moriarty, supra note 21, at 290; see P.L. 1915, ch. 295, § 48.
24. Moriarty, supra note 21, at 290.
25. Id. See also 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law §
1.01 (2009).
26. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 1 (2010). See also Maine Bureau of Insurance, An Employers’
Guide to Workers’ Compensation Insurance in Maine, MAINE.GOV (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://maine.gov/pfr/insurance/consumer/workcomp.htm.
27. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 201(1) (2010). The “arising out of and in the course of
employment” language is a relic from the original Workers’ Compensation Act in Maine. See Helen B.
Mailman’s Case, 118 Me. 172, 180, 106 A. 606, 610 (1919).
28. See Standring v. Town of Skowhegan, 2005 ME 51, ¶ 11, 870 A.2d 128; Cox v. Coastal Prods.
Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 8, 774 A.2d 347; Husvar v. Engineered Prods., Inc., 2000 ME 132, ¶ 5, 755 A.2d
498; Moore v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 669 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Me. 1995); Morse v. Laverdiere’s
Super Drug Store, 645 A.2d 613, 614 (Me. 1994); Somes v. Flint Logging, 635 A.2d 941, 942 (Me.
1993); Comeau v. Me. Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 365-67 (Me. 1982); Nadeau v. S. Berwick, 412
A.2d 392, 393-94 (Me. 1980); Metcalf v. Marine Colloids, Inc., 285 A.2d 367, 369 (Me. 1972).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). “An
employer must consent to receive the services of an employee. Consent to accept services can be
manifested through overt action or statement or through acquiescence.” Id.
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employee, and this concept is described in the doctrine of respondeat superior
liability.30 Mere receipt of payment for services is often not enough to be
considered an employee.31 This limitation on the scope of the employer/employee
relationship is intended to prevent the employer from remaining vicariously liable
for the acts of the employee over which the employer has no control.32 Thus, a
“right-to-control” test was the early common law solution to defining the
employment contract.33 There are seminal cases from England which influenced
the development of this doctrine in the United States, especially with regard to its
treatment of the differentiation between employees and independent contractors.34
As suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law:
Distinguishing employees from independent contractors by focusing primarily on
the master’s right to control the “physical conduct” of employees is an
understandable approach to setting the scope of the principal’s vicarious or
“respondeat superior” liability. Such enterprise liability would seem appropriately
predicated on the principal’s ability to control potentially tortious acts of its
agents. . . . The right-to-control test was first developed in part to protect
consumers or purchasers from vicarious liability for the acts of service providers
35
they could not control.

With a more developed understanding of why and how the employment contract
must be defined, we are better equipped to investigate the scope of the contract, and
to determine what actions do and do not arise out of and in the course of
employment. This determination is influenced to a large extent by the law of
master and servant, also known as the law of agency. In short, the terms of
employment are those dictated by the master.36
Since Comeau v. Maine Coastal Services37 was decided in 1982, the Law
Court has used the same set of standards to determine whether an injury arose out
of and in the course of employment.38 These eight factors include:
30. Id., reporters’ notes, cmt. a.
31. Id. cmt. b. “A statute . . . may contain express exclusions from its definition of ‘employee’ for
purposes of the statute’s coverage. The National Labor Relations Act, for instance, excludes
agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and supervisors, as well as independent contractors.” Id. cmt.
h.
32. Id., reporters’ notes, cmt. a.
33. Id.
34. Id. See, e.g., Quarman v. Burnett, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B.); 6 M. & W. 499 (involving
a failed attempt to hold the hirer of a horse-pulled coach vicariously liable for the negligence of the
driver); Laugher v. Pointer, (1826) 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (K.B.); 5 B. & C. 547 (same).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 cmt. a (1957).
The word ‘employment’ means the subject matter as to which the master and servant
relation exists. The phrase ‘scope of employment’ means the extent of this subject matter
and denotes the field of action within which one is a servant. The manifestations of the
master determine what conduct may be within the scope of employment, since it includes
only acts of the kind authorized, done within limits of time and space which approximate
those created by the authorization.
Id.
37. 449 A.2d 362 (Me. 1982).
38. See Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 6, 5 A.3d 669; Standring v. Town of
Skowhegan, 2005 ME 51, ¶ 11, 870 A.2d 128; Cox v. Coastal Prods. Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 8, 774 A.2d
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(1) Whether at the time of the injury the employee was promoting an interest of
the employer, or the activity of the employee directly or indirectly benefited the
employer; (2) Whether the activities of the employee work to the benefit or
accommodate the needs of the employer; (3) Whether the activities were within
the terms, conditions or customs of the employment, or were acquiesced in or
permitted by the employer; (4) Whether the activity of the employee serves both a
business and personal purpose, or represents an insubstantial deviation from the
employment; (5) Whether the hazard or causative condition can be viewed as
employer or employee created; (6) Whether the actions of the employee were
unreasonably reckless or created excessive risks or perils; (7) Whether the
activities of the employee incidental to the employment were prohibited by the
employer either expressly or implicitly; (8) Whether the injury occurred on the
39
premises of the employer.

This list was cumulative when it was drawn up by the Law Court in 1982, and was
supported by relevant Law Court decisions dating from 1921 through 1980.40 As
such, it stands as a strong comprehensive history of workers’ compensation and
scope of employment jurisprudence in Maine. It should be noted that although the
Comeau factors have often been cited by the Law Court,41 the application of the
factors to a particular case also demands a factual inquiry into the circumstances of
the injury as they relate to the employment situation. As stated in Comeau, “[t]hese
considerations as well as others do not create a dispositive checklist; rather, they
are but factors on the scale weighing toward or against a finding that the injury
arose out of and in the course of employment.”42 Some of the difficulties that stem
from the phrase “[arising] out of and in the course of employment” are discussed
below.
B. The Employment Contract and Workers’ Compensation in Other Jurisdictions
The right-to-control doctrine that evolved from common law has helped to
define the employment contract for well over a century.43 In connection with
common law notions of agency, the doctrine finds various formulations in Supreme
Court decisions through the latter half of the 1900s.44 Still, it is not an exclusive
347; Husvar v. Engineered Prods., Inc., 2000 ME 132, ¶ 5, 755 A.2d 498; Moore v. Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft, 669 A.2d 156, 158 (Me. 1995); Morse v. Laverdiere’s Super Drug Store, 645 A.2d 613, 614
(Me. 1994); Somes v. Flint Logging, 635 A.2d 941, 942 (Me. 1993).
39. Comeau, 449 A.2d at 367 (internal citations omitted).
40. See id.
41. See supra note 38.
42. Comeau, 449 A.2d at 367.
43. See Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. 1 (14 Pick.) (1833). The owners of a vessel that was
being towed by steamboat and damaged another vessel were not liable to the owners of the damaged
vessel for the negligence of the steamboat operators, because the operators were neither subject to the
control of the owners nor carrying on business for the owners’ profit at the time of the accident. Id. at 5.
See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1889). In Singer,the Supreme Court used the
right-to-control test to hold a manufacturer of horse drawn wagons liable for the negligent operation of
one of the wagons by a traveling salesperson working exclusively in the interests of the manufacturer,
even though the manufacturer was not in physical control of the wagon. Id.
44. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (interpreting, for
purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the term ‘employee’ in line with
common law notions of agency); Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)
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standard, and other tests have been used in the courts.45 For instance, the right-tocontrol test has been used in combination with an “economic realities” test in
federal courts46 as well as state courts.47
Virtually all jurisdictions in the country adhere to the doctrine of immunity and
exclusivity in workers’ compensation.48 Similarly, the “arising out of and in the
course of” language used in Maine since the state’s adoption of statutory workers’
compensation is paralleled in other state statutes.49 The phrase is an “axiom” of
compensation law.50 Even so, it is “one of the most familiar and most troublesome
concepts” in the field.51 In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Frank
Murphy, the phrase is “deceptively simple and litigiously prolific.”52 Whether or
not an injury arising out of and in the course of employment qualifies for
compensation is not governed by a bright line rule; it is a case by case analysis, and
oftentimes a muddled one.53
It is beyond the scope of this Note to undertake a comparative analysis of
workers’ compensation jurisprudence from all fifty states. However, as it is
(interpreting, for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term ‘employee’ in line with common law
notions of agency).
45. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 310 (2001) (stating “[C]ontrol over work
was never the exclusive test of status for either respondeat superior or other statutory purposes. . . . [B]y
the end of the nineteenth century the courts had already identified and assembled most of the other basic
‘factors’ recognized today as evidencing one or the other type of worker status.”).
46. For examples of opinions that utilize a combination of the economic realities test and the
common law test, see Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 263 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr.
Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804-05 (10th Cir. 1989); Brock
v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1988); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d
1529, 1534-35 (7th Cir. 1987). See also, e.g., Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976,
980 (10th Cir. 2002); Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999); Wilde v. Cnty. of
Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105–06 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89–91 (2d Cir.
1993); Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 218–19 (6th Cir. 1992).
47. See, e.g., Ark. Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 16 S.W.3d 545, 547–48 (Ark. 2000);
Re/Max of N.J. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 154, 157 (N.J. 2000); Whittenberg v. Graves Oil &
Butane Co., 827 P.2d 838, 844–45 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403-04 (Cal. 1989); Anton v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 688 P.2d 192, 194–95
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Woody v. Waibel, 554 P.2d 492, 496 (Or. 1976).
48. Moriarty, supra note 22, at 290.
49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(9) (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(2) (2011); ARIZ. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 8; ARKANSAS CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4)(A) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-40201(14) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(4) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.01
(2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(a) (West 2010).
50. McNamara v. Town of Hamden, 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1978).
51. Eady v. Med. Pers. Pool, 377 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1979).
52. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947).
53. See Herbert v. Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405 (H.L.) 419 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that
“[t]he few and seemingly simple words ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ have been
the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by
refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion. From their number
counsel can, in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in his favour, on whichever
side he may be, the question in dispute.”). See also Cudahy Packing Co. of Neb. v. Parramore, 263 U.S.
418, 424 (1923) (“Whether a given accident is so related or incident to the business must depend upon
its own particular circumstances. No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve
every case.”).
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pertinent to the discussions in Parts I, III, IV, and V of this Note, a comparative
analysis of some cases that involve travel to and from work related appointments is
warranted.
This particular subset of workers’ compensation cases receives
differing treatment depending on jurisdiction, and like so many other types of
workers’ compensation cases, seems in large part dependent upon judicial
interpretation of the omnipresent statutory phrase “arising out of and in the course
of employment.” To further focus this inquiry, only cases involving injuries
sustained while traveling to or from an appointment related to a prior compensable
injury will be discussed.
As a general rule:
[A]n injury or death occurring in the use of the public streets or highways in going
to and returning from the place of employment generally is not compensable under
workers’ compensation law because, in most instances, such an injury is suffered
as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public
are subject, rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the
54
work or business of the employer.

This principle, known as the “public streets rule” or the “going and coming rule,” is
widely accepted.55 However, a uniform application of the rule poses problems, and
there are a number of exceptions.56 Common exceptions include: proof of a causal
connection between employment and injury,57 employees who travel as part of their
job,58 transportation provided by the employer,59 employer reimbursement of
transportation expenses,60 employees on a special mission for the employer,61 and
injuries occurring on the premises of or within the zone of employment.62 As a
result of the many exceptions to the rule, the interpretation and inclusion of a
particular exception will vary by jurisdiction. Jurisdictions are even split on the
specific question of the compensability of injuries sustained en route to receive
medical treatment for prior compensable injuries.63 To reiterate, this is a vast and
54. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 269 (2003) (footnote omitted).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 272.
57. See, e.g., Torres v. Aulick Leasing, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 212, 218 (Neb. 2001); Rico v. All Phase
Elec. Supply Co., 675 A.2d 406, 408 (R.I. 1996).
58. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 272 (2003).
59. See, e.g., Governair Corp. v. Dist. Court of Okla. Cnty., 293 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Okla. 1956).
60. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 339 S.E.2d 292, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Hyatt House, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 437 A.2d 461, 463
(Pa. Commn. Ct. 1981).
62. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 283 (2003).
63. For examples of opinions holding that injuries sustained en route to medical treatment for prior
compensable injuries do not arise out of or in the course of employment, see Dean v. Chrysler Corp.,
455 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Mich. 1990); Bankers Inv. Co. v. Boyd, 560 P.2d 958, 960-62 (Okla. 1977);
Whitington v. Indus. Comm’n, 468 P.2d 926, 927-28 (Ariz. 1970); Kiger v. Idaho Corp., 380 P.2d 208,
209-11 (Idaho 1963); Combined Ins. Co. v. Peoples, 428 S.E.2d 391, 391-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Hicks
v. Spectra Physics, 843 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 362 So. 2d
1214, 1215-17 (La. Ct. App. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 376 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979); Carlson v.
Young, 171 N.E.2d 736, 737-39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Pittsburgh Hyatt House, 437 A.2d at 462-64.
For examples of opinions holding that injuries sustained en route to medical treatment for prior
compensable injuries do in fact arise out of or in the course of employment, see Case of McElroy, 494
N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. 1986); Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289, 1294-95 (Me. 1979); Charles N.
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convoluted field of law, and there are no bright line tests readily applicable to any
particular case, regardless of jurisdiction.64 Rather, a fact intensive inquiry is
always necessary, and an examination of the particulars of the employment
relationship and the circumstances surrounding the injury must be undertaken in
order to decide whether or not the injury is compensable.65
III. THE FEIEREISEN DECISION
In Feiereisen, the Law Court endeavored to resolve a single question:
“whether the injury resulting from a car accident that occurred en route to a
workers’ compensation mediation arose out of and in the course of employment.”66
Kurt Feiereisen was first injured while working as a belt driver in the shipping
department at the Newpage Corporation (formerly known as the Rumford Paper
Mill) in 1987.67 This incident resulted in damage to his neck, mid-back, and left
arm.68 The same injury recurred in 1997.69 After the 1997 injury, he was
transferred to a light duty position at the company, and worked in the guardhouse at
the Farrington Mountain Landfill station until 2007, when as a result of poor
ergonomic conditions he sustained further gradual injury to his back.70 In 2008,
when driving to the Lewiston Regional Office of the Workers’ Compensation
Board to attend a mediation meeting regarding his three previous injuries,
Feiereisen was involved in a car accident and injured his left shoulder.71 He was
unable to work during the subsequent seven months, then resumed light duty work
only on a periodic basis. 72 Prior to returning to work, he filed a petition for
compensation relating to four dates of injury, including the car accident.73 The
hearing officer at the Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petitions for the
three injuries sustained prior to 2008, but denied the petition relating to the car
accident because he found that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of

Clark Assocs. v. Dependent of Robinson, 357 So. 2d 924, 929 (Miss. 1978); Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan,
152 S.E.2d 254, 259 (Va. 1967); Thibault v. Bostrom, 134 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1965); Taylor v.
Centex Constr. Co., 379 P.2d 217, 224 (Kan. 1963); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 736 S.W.2d 21, 21-23 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1987); Fenton v. SAIF Corp., 741 P.2d 517, 520 (Ore. Ct. App. 1987); Telcon, Inc. v.
Williams, 500 So. 2d 266, 266-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Camp v. Lockheed Elecs., Inc., 429 A.2d
615, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Augustine v. NYS Elmira Corr. Facility, 410 N.Y.S.2d 141,
142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Laines v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 122 Cal. Rptr. 139, 144 (Cal. Ct.
App.1975). But see 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
§ 10.07 (2009) (stating that most jurisdictions agree that injuries sustained when traveling to or from a
medical appointment for a compensable work related injury are also compensable).
64. See Cudahy Packing Co. of Neb. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424 (1923).
65. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 148 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716-17 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978); Madden v. Mountain W. Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861, 864-65 (Colo. 1999); Wiley Mfg. Co. v.
Wilson, 373 A.2d 613, 621-22 (Md. 1977).
66. Feiereisen v. Newpage Corp., 2010 ME 98, ¶ 5, 5 A.3d 669.
67. Id. ¶ 2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 4.
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employment.74 The Law Court granted Feiereisen’s timely appeal.75
Feiereisen argued that an exception to the “public streets” rule applied to his
car accident.76 To support this argument, he relied on the precedent set by the Law
Court in Moreau v. Zayre Corp., which stated that an injury sustained in a car
accident by an employee who was driving home from medical treatment for an
earlier compensable injury was also compensable.77 The rationale behind the
Moreau decision was that the employer had a statutory obligation to provide
medical services, and the employee had a reciprocal obligation to accept those
services, so the travel to the medical appointment fell within the scope of the
employment contract.78 Feiereisen applied this rationale to his car accident, and
asserted that, because his participation at the mediation was mandatory, travel to
the meeting was part of the employment contract.79 He further attempted to
distinguish the mediation from litigation and claimed that part of the legislative
intent behind mandatory mediation was to facilitate cooperation between the
employer and employee in place of litigation.80
In response, Newpage argued that the case was instead governed by Dorey v.
Forster Manufacturing Co., which held that an injury sustained by an employee
while she was retrieving records to pursue her workers’ compensation claim did not
arise out of and in the course of employment and was not compensable.81 In
Dorey, the Law Court asserted that, because the retrieval of documents was not
done for purposes of medical treatment, but rather, to have them available at an
“informal conference” for purposes of pursuing a claim that the employer was
“actively contesting,” the action was not “implied into the contract of
employment.”82 The Law Court also observed in Dorey that other jurisdictions
have held that actions taken in furtherance of a workers’ compensation claim
against an employer do not arise out of and in the course of employment.83
The majority of the Law Court held in favor of Newpage and affirmed the
decision of the hearing officer.84 Justice Gorman, writing for the majority, decided
that an injury sustained during travel to workers’ compensation mediation did not
arise out of and in the course of employment.85 The majority opinion gave
74. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 5.
76. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
77. Id. (citing Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289, 1291, 1295 (Me. 1979)).
78. Moreau, 408 A.2d at 1294.
79. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 669.
80. Id. ¶ 12.
81. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Dorey v. Forster Mfg. Co., 591 A.2d 240, 241 (Me. 1991)).
82. Dorey, 591 A.2d at 241-42.
83. Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242 n.1. See Hendrickson v. George Madsen Constr. Co., 281 N.W.2d 672,
672, 675 (Minn. 1979) (deciding that an employee’s fatal heart attack occurring shortly after testimony
at a workers’ compensation hearing did not arise out of and in the course of employment). See also
Keovorabouth v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 214 P.3d 1019, 1023-24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
an injury sustained by an employee when traveling to a workers’ compensation proceeding did not arise
out of and in the course of employment); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 140 S.E.2d 173, 17576 (S.C. 1965) (holding that an injury sustained by an employee when traveling to a workers’
compensation hearing was not compensable because the travel was for personal benefit).
84. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669.
85. Id. ¶ 1.
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numerous reasons for arriving at this conclusion, including that the statutory
mandate to participate in mediation did not transform the travel thereto into part of
the employment contract,86 that the travel served only Feiereisen’s own purpose
and did not benefit Newpage,87 that injuries occurring at dispute resolution events
are not covered under workers’ compensation,88 and that the accident fell within
the “public streets rule” and fit no exception to that rule.89
In deciding that the applicable statute90 did not go so far as to include workers’
compensation mediation in the employment contract, the majority was careful to
note that although mediation was intended to make the compensation process “less
adversarial and more flexible and realistic,” it ultimately retained its semblance to
litigation.91 As such, travel to the meeting did not benefit or promote “the interests
of” Newpage.92 The majority also considered the mediation hearing to be part of a
dispute resolution system which was separate from the employment setting covered
by workers’ compensation.93
In the majority opinion, Justice Gorman included a brief analysis of the public
streets rule and its exceptions.94 The essence of the rule, as stated in Waycott v.
Beneficial Corp., is that “an accident occurring off the employer’s premises while
an employee is merely on his way to or from his place of business is not, without
more, compensable.”95 The rationale behind the rule is that “while outside the
business premises and not engaged in any work-related activity an employee is not
within the spatiotemporal boundaries of employment . . . [and] there is an
insufficient connection with the employment context to warrant compensation for
an injury occurring in such circumstances.”96 The majority declined to apply any
of the exceptions to the rule,97 stating that Newpage could not have controlled or
affected the risk of Feiereisen’s accident and had no responsibility over the
automobile or the driving public at the time.98
In dissent, Justice Jabar, joined by Justice Alexander, found that the statutory
obligation to participate in mediation led to the inclusion of travel to mediation as
part of the employment contract.99 The dissent equated the statutory duty of the
employer to provide medical care, as described in Moreau,100 with the statutory
duty of both the employer and employee to attend the mediation of workers’
compensation claims.101 This equation was drawn, in part, through the “significant
86. Id. ¶ 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 12.
89. Id. ¶ 13.
90. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010).
91. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 12, 5 A.3d 669.
92. Id. ¶ 13.
93. Id. ¶ 12.
94. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
95. 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979). See also Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669.
96. Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394. See also Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669.
97. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
98. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669.
99. Id. ¶14 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
100. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
101. Id. ¶ 22. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010) (mandating that parties cooperate in
mediation and imposing sanctions for a failure to do so).
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relationship” exception to the public streets rule.102 Under this exception, the
dissent noted that when there is “a significant relationship between injury and
employment,” certain injuries sustained by an employee on the way to or from a
place of business have been considered compensable.103 In short, the dissent
followed Moreau by implying that an injury occurring during travel to mediation
for a prior work related injury would also arise out of and in the course of
employment.104
Justice Jabar also distinguished Dorey, claiming that because title 39-A,
section 313 of the Maine Revised Statutes was passed105 after Dorey was decided,
deference to legislative intent should ensue.106 In other words, the dissent argued
that the viability of Dorey was diminished by the statutory change. The legislative
intent behind the statute was also referenced by the dissent in order to refine the
distinction between litigation and mediation; the dissent claimed that the
collaborative aspects of mediation distinguished it from litigation.107 The dissent
concluded by enumerating cases from other jurisdictions wherein compensation
was available for injuries sustained during travel to and from work related
activities,108 and asserted that the reciprocal obligations mandated by statute were
“inherent in the contract of employment” and that travel to and from mandatory
mediation fell within an exception to the public streets rule.109
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Public Streets Rule and the Exceptions Thereto
The public streets rule is a necessary limitation on the scope of the
employment contract for purposes of workers’ compensation. The simple rationale
behind the rule is that an “insufficient connection” exists between the perils that
one encounters as a member of the traveling public and the risks that one incurs
when engaging in work-related activities to justify compensating employees for
injuries that arise during travel to and from work.110 To reiterate, the principle was
nicely illustrated in Waycott and restated in Feiereisen: “an accident occurring off
the employer’s premises while an employee is merely on his way to or from his
place of business is not, without more, compensable.”111 The phrase “without
102. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 15, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting) (quoting Waycott v. Beneficial
Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979)).
103. Id. (quoting Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394).
104. Id. ¶ 16.
105. Section 313 was enacted as part of a change in the Workers’ Compensation law following the
recommendations of a Blue Ribbon Commission, effective Jan. 1, 1993. Id. ¶ 19.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 20.
108. Id. ¶ 21. The dissent cited the following cases: Turner v. Indus. Claim App. Office, 111 P.3d
534, 537-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (involving travel from a vocational evaluation); American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 642 N.W.2d 584, 590-91 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (involving travel to medical
evaluation); Woodrum v. Premier Auto Glass Co., 660 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(involving travel from a medical examination).
109. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 22, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
110. Waycott v. Beneficial Corp., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (Me. 1979).
111. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 7, 5 A.3d 669 (quoting Waycott, 400 A.2d at 394).

2011]

IT HAS TO END SOMEWHERE

337

more” suggests that the nuances and idiosyncrasies of the doctrine are all contained
in its exceptions.
The Feiereisen Court stated that when a “sufficient connection” existed
between employment and employee travel, that exceptions to the rule were
recognized.112 The opinion then listed a number of recognized exceptions,113 but
isolated the one announced in Moreau114 as central to Feiereisen’s argument.
Despite the fact that the employee in Moreau was driving to a medical appointment
regarding a prior injury for which she had not yet filed a petition, the Law Court
held that the compensability of the prior injury was a determining factor, and that
the statutory obligation of the employer to provide and the employee to receive
medical treatment was part of the employment contract.115 The major and obvious
difference between Moreau and Feiereisen is the purpose behind the travel that
gave rise to the injury. The medical purpose of the appellant’s travel in Moreau
was deemed within the scope of the employment contract, and the mediation
purpose of the appellant’s travel in Feiereisen was not.116 In neither context did the
employer control the risk of the accident; it is implied that there is something
essentially different between medical treatment and mediation.
The Law Court in Feiereisen recognized that the legislative intent behind
mandatory mediation under 39-A M.R.S. § 313 was to promote collaboration and
replace litigation whenever possible, but ultimately decided that mediation retained
enough litigation-like qualities to preclude it from being covered under a workers’
compensation scheme.117 It is interesting to note that when the Law Court made
the distinction that “injuries occurring during attendance at dispute resolution
events are not compensable,”118 it diverged from a discussion of the public streets
rule. If this distinction is applied to Moreau, it should follow that had the injury in
Moreau occurred at the doctor’s office instead of on the way home from the office,
it would also have been compensable.119 This is to say, that a doctor’s office is

112. Id. ¶ 8.
113. Id. See, e.g., Cox v. Coastal Prods. Co., 2001 ME 100, ¶ 10, 774 A.2d 347 (applying a “dual
purpose” exception to a trip that served both business and private purposes); Abshire v. City of
Rockland, 388 A.2d 512, 514-15 (Me. 1978) (applying a “special errand” exception to travel undertaken
at the request of the employer); Oliver v. Wyandotte Indus. Corp., 308 A.2d 860, 863 (Me. 1973)
(applying a “special hazard” exception when the risks of employment continue after the employee has
entered the public way); Brown v. Palmer Constr. Co., 295 A.2d 263, 267 (Me. 1972) (applying a
“traveling employee” exception to injuries that arise from the necessity of sleeping and eating away
from home).
114. Moreau v. Zayre Corp., 408 A.2d 1289 (Me. 1979).
115. Id. at 1291, 1294. See also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 206 (2010) (relating to the duties and
rights of parties as to medical and other services).
116. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 13, 5 A.3d 669.
117. Id. ¶ 12.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. The questions then arise: would the employer or the doctor’s office be responsible for the
injury? Did the injury occur in the parking lot, the waiting area, or the examination room? As one can
imagine, this situation might implicate medical malpractice insurance as well. It is easy to get carried
away with such a hypothetical, but the point is that when dealing with workers’ compensation, as
suggested by the title of this Note, “it has to end somewhere.” The use of the word “at” by the Law
Court may have been inadvertent, but it does raise further questions, many of which are beyond the
scope of this Note.
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sufficiently connected to employment to fall within the employment contract, but
that a dispute resolution event is not. The implicit logic behind this divergence is
that the statutory obligation of the employer to provide and the employee to submit
to medical treatment is in the interests of the employer, but that the statutory
obligation of both employer and employee to appear at the mediation of an active
workers’ compensation claim against the employer is not in the interests of the
employer.
The Feiereisen decision hinged upon the interests of the employer: because
Feiereisen’s action of driving to the mediation hearing did not promote the interests
of Newpage, no exception to the public streets rule was implicated.120 Once
Moreau was implicitly distinguished, the case fell neatly within the ambit of the
proscriptive rule, and the potential expansion of the employment contract was
curtailed as in Dorey.121 To quote the Law Court: “Feiereisen’s travel that day
served only his own purpose: to proceed with his claim for benefits by participating
in the current-day equivalent of Dorey’s informal conference, i.e., a mediation
session. It did not ‘benefit’ Newpage any more than his attendance at a hearing
would benefit Newpage.”122 Thus, by relying upon the relative simplicity of the
public streets rule itself, the Law Court was able to avert the complications of
statutory interpretation that were raised by the dissent.
B. Why the Employment Contract Should Not Be Extended to Include Travel to
and From Mandatory Mediation
There is a strong public interest in limiting the scope of the employment
contract to activities that are undertaken in the interest of the employer. Without
this limitation, the incentive for an employer to retain employees would diminish in
proportion to the increased scope of employment. One can easily imagine that the
ordinary course of business in the marketplace would become unmanageable if an
employer were responsible for all acts and injuries of an employee as he or she
pursued interests outside of work.
While the majority opinion drew a clear boundary to the scope of the
employment contract, the dissent pushed the limits of this scope, spurred on by the
legislative impetus behind title 39-A, section 313 of the Maine Revised Statutes.123
120. Id. ¶ 13.
121. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.
122. Id. ¶ 11.
123. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010) (providing, in part: “The mediator shall by informal
means, which may include telephone contact, determine the nature and extent of the controversy and
attempt to resolve it. The mediator . . . may require that the parties appear and submit relevant
information. . . . The parties shall cooperate with the mediator assigned to the case. The assigned
mediator shall report to the board the failure of a party to cooperate or to produce requested material.
The board may impose sanctions against a party who does not cooperate or produce requested materials,
including the following: A. Assessment of costs and attorney’s fees; B. Reductions of attorney’s fees; or
C. If the party is the moving party, suspension of proceedings until the party has cooperated or produced
the requested material. . . . The employer or representative of the employee, employer or insurer who
participates in mediation must be familiar with the employee’s claim and has authority to make
decisions regarding the claim. The board may assess a forfeiture in the amount of $100 against any
employer or representative of the employee, employer or insurer who participates in mediation without
full authority to make decisions regarding the claim. If a representative of the employer, insurer or
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The dissent initially distinguished Moreau from Dorey,124 but then implied that the
two cases were analogized by the enactment of the statute,125 which Justice Jabar
claimed made a “significant change in the workers’ compensation law.”126 This
change, according to the dissent, made mediation, as a cooperative process
supported by possible sanctions against non-cooperation, “distinctly different from
other stages of litigation.”127 Based upon this interpretation of the statute, the
dissent viewed the mediation as within the scope of the employment contract, as
was the medical treatment in Moreau, and stated that travel to mediation fell within
an exception to the public streets rule.128 In other words, the dissent suggested that
section 313 nullified the majority’s reliance on prior case law, by reasoning that the
mandatory mediation imposed by the statute should not be equated to the informal
conference in Dorey.129
Under a customary understanding of the agency relationship, section 313 does
not alter the interests of the employer as is suggested by the dissent. Thus, the
“interests” of the employer are not implicated by mandatory participation in
mediation.130 Even though non-participation may bring monetary sanctions, and
the employer will be responsible for paying the costs of treating the employee’s
injury if the employee prevails, the mediation itself is not in furtherance of the
employment enterprise as a going concern. It is not the exclusive interests of the
employer and employee that are at stake during mediation: a public policy interest
in favor of mediation, contrived by the Legislature, is also involved. Is the
employer forced to accept the Legislature’s notion of what is and what is not in his
or her best interests as an employer? A much broader debate emerges as a result of
such questions, and implicates the tension between the principle of freedom of
contract and governmental regulation of business. The debate over the respective
strengths and weaknesses of these often conflicting forces is beyond the scope of
this Note.
Regardless, the section of the statute which mandates that the parties cooperate
in mediation and imposes sanctions for noncompliance mentions nothing of the
employment contract.131 A mere mandate to cooperate at a dispute resolution
event does not, in the words of the majority, “transform Feiereisen’s attendance at
mediation into an obligation that is reciprocal to any employer action or

employee participates in mediation or any other proceeding of the board, the representative shall notify
the employer, insurer or employee of all actions by the representative on behalf of the employer, insurer
or employee and any other actions at the proceeding.”).
124. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶¶ 16-18, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
125. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313 (2010).
126. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 19, 5 A.3d 669 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
127. Id. ¶ 20.
128. Id. ¶ 22.
129. Id. ¶ 19. See id. ¶¶ 10-11, 5 A.3d at 673-74.
130. The majority and dissent may have differing conceptions of what the word ‘interest’ means in
this instance. Compare id. ¶ 11 (majority opinion) (adopting a meaning that is more akin to “benefit”),
with id. ¶¶ 18-20 (Jabar, J., dissenting) (contrasting the notion of a selfish benefit to either party, as
presented by the majority, with a more neutral concept that applies to the collective well being of both
parties (as they pursue a legislatively coerced reconciliation)).
131. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 313(4) (2010).

340

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

obligation.”132 In the event of statutory ambiguity, it is inappropriate to project
onto the law an implication about the scope of the employment contract, especially
when the only recognized legislative intent was to “encourage mediation.”133 The
two policy interests at stake here, the policy of not unduly broadening the scope of
employer liability and the policy of encouraging mediation of compensation
claims, are not necessarily competing. If the statute is taken at face value, there is
no reason why both policies cannot work in harmony. Mediation can be
encouraged, and, for purposes of workers’ compensation claims, be considered
outside the scope of the employment contract. The words of the statute do nothing
to either confirm or dispel this possibility.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the enactment of section 313 arguably does create a legal difference
between mandatory mediation and informal mediation conferences, the scope of
the employment contract for purposes of workers’ compensation is not necessarily
impacted by the change, and it seems clear that in this case the majority made the
correct decision. From a policy perspective, and given Feiereisen’s twenty year
history with work related injuries,134 it was entirely prudent to prevent the
expansion of the employment contract into arenas wherein the employee was acting
outside of the interests of the employer.
The majority drew a rather strict line on this matter, whereas the dissent looked
to the statute for guidance. But by reading too deeply into the purposes behind the
legislation, the dissent created an extension of the employment contract where none
was warranted. The broad consent of the employer to participate in a workers’
compensation program should not extend the scope of the employment contract to
include such unforeseen particularities as the travel of the employee to a mandatory
mediation meeting.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is held liable for the
actions of the employee when the employee is acting within the scope of his or her
duty to the employer.135 Therefore, when the employee is working in the interest of
and furthering the goals of the employer, the employer retains an obligation of
responsibility over the actions of the employee, and also, as pertinent to workers’
compensation, over the safety of the employee. When the employee acts beyond
the scope of employment, the employer is not liable for his or her actions or safety.
132. Feiereisen, 2010 ME 98, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 669.
133. Id. ¶ 19 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
134. Though there may not be any factual support for the notion that Feiereisen was malingering, the
mere duration and repetition of his petitions for workers’ compensation may have been a further and
unstated rationale for the Law Court to limit the scope of his employment contract with Newpage. For
statutory authority relating to another possible unstated rationale of the Law Court, the possibility of
double recovery under automobile liability insurance and workers’ compensation, see generally ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 107 (2010) (stating that the employee must repay to the employer the value of
any compensation paid which is subsequently recovered from the third party liable for the injury). The
Law Court did not address the issue of whether the January 2008 car accident was a result Feiereisen’s
own negligence, whether he was injured by the negligence of a third party tortfeasor, or whether the
accident involved contributory negligence on the part of both parties. See generally, Feiereisen, 2010
ME 98, 5 A.3d 669.
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.2, 2009).
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The “interests of the employer” standard helps to draw a clear line between an
employee getting paid to work for an employer, and an employee seeking payment
when he or she is injured during employment. When an employee brings a
workers’ compensation claim against his or her employer, it seems inappropriate to
claim that he or she is working in the service of the employer. This determination
should be quite straightforward: if the employer is contesting the claim, then the
employee is not acting in the service of the employer by attending a mediation
hearing. The employee nearly rises to the level of an adverse party in such
instances, and should no longer be considered to be under the control of the
employer. The reciprocity requirement imposed by statute is a mutual obligation
similar to that guaranteed by contract, but more closely resembling the compulsion
to show up in court before an adverse party. The statute is not geared toward
preserving the employment relationship at the time of mediation, but rather, toward
preserving the just and orderly pursuit of the mediation itself, and in doing so,
requiring that both parties to the action participate. The employer does not give
voluntary consent to authorize the actions of the employee at this point, but is
required by statute to relinquish the “right to control.” Arguably, it is the
Legislature, and not the employer, that exercises the “right to control” at this
juncture. The statute may actually deprive the employer of the ability to consent to
mediation, thus driving the mediation outside the scope of the employment
contract. It is unjust to fuse an independent consent to mediation with the statutory
obligation to concede to mediation.
Fulfilling an obligation and fulfilling an obligation under a contract can be one
and the same thing. They can also, as in this case, be different things. If viewed
independently of the prior employment relationship, the obligation to participate in
mediation lacks consideration for the employer. This is to say, that the employer
receives nothing in return for attending mediation, other than the prospect of
avoiding litigation and possibly relieving the company of an outstanding
compensation claim. The agreement to immunity under workers’ compensation
law, that is, the agreement that the employee may not sue the employer for injuries
sustained during employment, is not sufficient consideration to extend the scope of
the employment contract so far beyond the benefit which the employer receives
from his or her business as a going concern. The mediation is a mere remedial
measure, not an ex post facto extension of employment. In order to retain the idea
that employer and employee work together to further the interests of a single
enterprise, the limits of the employment contract must be drawn to exclude such a
quasi-adversarial proceeding as mandatory mediation, and clearly must exclude the
travel to and from such an event.

